Hitler was open about his refusal to accept many of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Shortly after becoming Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he again began arming the country and breaking the restrictions imposed on the German Wehrmacht. In 1936 he sent German troops to the Rhineland and in March 1938 he joined Germany and Austria. Czechoslovakia was the next logical step in its aggression, and the German Nazis in the Sudetenland were asked to stir up the difficulties that led to the crisis studied here. Edvard Benes, the leader of Czechoslovakia, feared that if Germany received the Sudetenland, most of the Czech defense would be handed over to the Germans and that they would remain defenseless. [silent] An agreement signed at the Munich Conference in September 1938 ceded the German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany. The agreement was concluded between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France. Czechoslovakia was not allowed to participate in the conference. In March 1939, six months after the munich accords were signed, Hitler violated the agreement and destroyed the Czech state. UCLA Film and Television Archive After his success in recording Austria in Germany in March 1938, Adolf Hitler seemed desirable in Czechoslovakia, where about three million people in the Sudetenland were of German descent. In April, he discussed with Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the Bundeswehr`s high command, the political and military aspects of “Case Green,” the code name for the planned Sudeten takeover. A surprise attack on “clear skies with no reason or justification” was rejected because the result would have been “hostile world opinion that could lead to a critical situation.” Decisive action would therefore take place only after a period of German political turmoil in Czechoslovakia, accompanied by diplomatic disputes which, as they became more serious, either built up war excuses themselves or created the occasion for a lightning offensive after an “incident” of German creativity.
In addition, there had been disturbing political activities in Czechoslovakia since October 1933, when Konrad Henlein founded the Sudeten German Home Front. It is strange to think that this sudden return to the arts of obscuration and oppression comes at a time when the growth of democratic ideas and the triumphs of invention seemed to spread the General Enlightenment. President Wilson, inventing formulations that led to such unfortunate results, spoke at the peace conference of open alliances that were made openly, thinking that justice and the peace of success were assured when people lived in broad daylight. When Bridges wrote his beauty testament, he thought Wireless had made a war much less likely. He argued that “the voice drowned in truth, enveloped by the speed of light,” would spread across the land and sea. One aspect of the enormous turmoil of the past two weeks must affect anyone thinking about its history. In the three most powerful states of Central and Eastern Europe, people were not allowed to know what was being said and done outside. In Russia, there seems to have been very little news. In Germany and Italy, news was deliberately falsified if it was not suppressed.
The German people were not allowed to know President Roosevelt`s message. The Italian people were led to believe that Chamberlain agreed with Hitler and was only concerned with putting pressure on Benes. They were given a bad version of one of his speeches. The Munich Accords (Czech: Mnichovská dohoda; Slovak: Mníchovská dohoda; Munich Agreement) or Munich Betrayal (Czech: Mnichovská zrada; Mníchovská zrada) was an agreement concluded in Munich on September 30, 1938 by Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, the French Third Republic and the Kingdom of Italy. He granted Germany the “cession of the Sudeten German territory” from Czechoslovakia.  Most European countries celebrated the agreement because it prevented the war threatened by Adolf Hitler by allowing Nazi Germany to annex the Sudetenland, a region in western Czechoslovakia inhabited by more than 3 million people, mostly German-speaking. Hitler proclaimed this was his last territorial claim in Europe, and the choice seemed to be between war and appeasement. The agreement that allowed the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was signed on September 29, 1938. Faced with high tensions between the Germans and the Czechoslovak government, Beneš secretly offered on September 15, 1938 to give Germany 6,000 square kilometers (2,300 square miles) of Czechoslovakia in exchange for a German agreement to admit 1.5 to 2.0 million Sudeten Germans, whom Czechoslovakia would expel.
Hitler did not respond.  Until December 1938, the Sudetenland was the most National Socialist region of the Reich, since half a million Sudeten Germans had become members of the NSDAP. Daladier was convinced that the deal would not appease the Nazis and that disaster was yet to come, while Chamberlain thought there was reason to celebrate, mistakenly convinced that he had achieved peace. The day after the agreement was signed, Germany retook the Sudetenland. The Czechoslovaks did not retaliate. On March 15, 1939, Hitler occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Slovakia had become an autonomous Nazi puppet state the day before. Many Sudeten Germans acquired jobs in the protectorate or as Gestapo agents because they were fluent in Czech. Northern Ruthenia, which hoped for independence, was taken over by Hungary. The 5. In October, Beneš resigned as president of Czechoslovakia, realizing that the fall of Czechoslovakia was inevitable. After the outbreak of World War II, he formed a Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London.
On 6 December 1938, the Franco-German Non-Aggression Pact is signed in Paris by French Foreign Minister Bonnet and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.    “Munich and appeasement,” in the words of scholars Frederik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, “have become one of the dirtiest words in American politics, synonymous with naivety and weakness, and signify a cowardly willingness to exchange the nation`s vital interests for empty promises.” They argued that the success of U.S. foreign policy often depends on a president “resisting the inevitable accusations of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.” Presidents who questioned the “tyranny of Munich” often made political breakthroughs, and those who cited Munich as a principle of American foreign policy often led the nation into its “most enduring tragedies.”  Undoubtedly, radio technology has had a great influence over the past two weeks, as the contrast between German school silence and the moderation of leaders of other countries, including Czechoslovakia in particular, has made a great impression here in the United States, and in all neutral countries. .